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Congressional opinions of war change with the events on the
battlefield
The Iraq War Resolution of October 2002 was broadly supported in Congress, passing with
bipartisan majorities in both chambers (296-133; 77-23), but the conflict rapidly became
unpopular, especially with members of the Democratic Party. Drawing on data from the Iraq War,
Douglas Kriner examines how members of Congress respond to casualties, both on the national
level and within their constituencies. He argues that congressional feelings on a conflict should be
of great concern to the president because members of Congress are highly effective at rallying
their constituents to support a war.
President Obama stunned many Americans this past August when he announced that he would first go to
Congress to seek its blessing for a military strike against the Syrian regime of Bashar Al-Assad for its use of
chemical weapons. Since World War II, presidents have routinely invoked their authority as commander in chief to
order American military strikes across the globe without first seeking congressional assent. At the same time,
Congress has repeatedly shown itself unwilling to use the formal legislative tools at its disposal to curb military
actions with which it disagrees. Why then, did Obama look to Congress? The President’s decision reminds us that
even when Congress does not legislate, the public positions that its members take on a war may nonetheless be
politically important. Presidents value public expressions of support and seek to avoid vocal criticism—the “sniping
from the sidelines” alluded to by President Obama in his August 31 address—of their military policies.
Despite its political importance,
we know surprisingly little about
the factors driving congressional
wartime position-taking. As the
American experience in Vietnam
plainly showed, the wartime
positions of members of both
parties can evolve significantly
over time. Co-author Francis
Shen and I argue that members
of Congress respond to events
as they unfold on the battlefield
when deciding whether to publicly
support or oppose the president
and his policies. However, how
members react to battlefield
events is in large part conditional
on their political partisanship.
Members of the opposition party
are inherently more inclined to
criticize the president’s conduct
of a war than are his co-partisans on Capitol Hill. But even opposition members are wary that their positions may
be seen as failing to support the troops in the field. For such members, setbacks on the battlefield, such as spikes
in American casualties, raise important questions about the president’s policies and open windows of opportunity
for public criticisms of the commander in chief.
By contrast, the president’s co-partisans stand to gain little from criticizing the administration, even in the wake of
high casualties. Any effort to distance themselves from a costly war is likely to be undermined by an overall
weakening of their party’s brand name. As a result, co-partisans are often reluctant to challenge their leader at the
other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, even in the face of mounting battle deaths.
However, some members of the president’s party can eventually be persuaded to break publicly with the
administration – and such same-party criticism receives considerable attention from the mass media. Local
casualties from a member’s own constituency are important drivers of public war criticism for members of all
partisan stripes. Even the president’s co-partisans respond to mounting casualties affecting their narrow
geographic constituencies by becoming more vocal in their disapproval of the war and the president’s handling of
it.
We test these hypotheses through an analysis of more than 7,500 speeches given on the House floor concerning
the war in Iraq from 2003 through 2010. In the aggregate, we find unambiguous evidence that Democratic anti-
war rhetoric increases when casualties rise and wanes when the casualty rate decreases. Republican criticism of
the war, by contrast, was unrelated to casualty trends in the aggregate. However, as illustrated in the predicted
values presented in Figure 1, both Democratic and Republican members responded to casualties sustained in
their district by becoming more publicly critical of the war. To be sure, even Republicans representing districts that
sustained high casualty levels were reticent to criticize the war. However, any public criticism from Republicans
was amplified by a media eager to highlight even modest fissures in the GOP ranks.
Figure 1: District Casualties and War Criticism
But do the positions taken in Congress
actually affect the American public’s
willingness to back a war? With Congress’
approval rating mired in the teens and
occasionally dipping even into the single
digits, there are reasons for skepticism.
Nevertheless, previous research suggests
that when congressional elites of both
parties support a war, the public rallies
around it as well. By contrast, when elites
divide over a conflict’s wisdom, the public
follows suit. Moreover, as Richard Fenno
observed forty years ago, while Americans
routinely proclaim their distaste for
Congress as an institution, most express
considerable support for their local
representative. Building on Fenno’s insight,
we exploit the significant variation in
congressional position-taking across the country to examine whether the positions taken by individual members of
Congress regarding the Iraq War influenced the willingness of their constituents to support or oppose the conflict.
Americans from districts represented by members who publicly and intensely criticized the Iraq War repeatedly
were significantly more likely to judge the war a mistake and to oppose staying the course there than were
Americans living in other districts represented by members who were less vocally critical of the war. In this way,
members of Congress can raise the domestic political costs for the President to pursue his preferred military
policy course by brining public pressure to bear on the administration, even when Congress as a whole finds itself
unable to act legislatively to rein in a wayward commander in chief.
This article is based on the paper “Responding to War on Capitol Hill: Battlefield Casualties, Congressional
Response, and Public Support for the War in Iraq,” which appeared in the American Journal of Political Science.
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